Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1

Article 16

1997

The Effect of Laughlin v. Evanston Hospital on
Consumer Fraud Act Claims for Nondeceptive
Unfair Acts or Practices
Laurence M. Landsman
Partner, Block & Landsman

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Laurence M. Landsman The Effect of Laughlin v. Evanston Hospital on Consumer Fraud Act Claims for Nondeceptive Unfair Acts or
Practices, 9 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 54 (1997).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol9/iss1/16

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

FEATURE

ARTICLE

The Effect of Laughlin v. Evanston
Hospital on Consumer Fraud Act
Claims For Nondeceptive Unfair
Acts or Practices
by Laurence M. Landsman

Tucked away like an old family secret, the Il- Laughlin without even a citation and have conlinois Supreme Court's 1990 decision inLaughlin tinued the more traditional notion that
v. Evanston Hospital,' which addresses the Illi- nondeceptive unfair conduct violates the CFA. 9
After reviewing the pre-Laughlinstandards for
nois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (the "CFA"),' has achieved a unique asserting CFA claims based on nondeceptive
status. Lower courts so underwhelmed by unfair acts or practices, this article details the
Laughlin not only ignore its precedential value, Laughlin opinion as well as its impact-and lack
they fail to acknowledge its very existence.' The thereof-on subsequent decisions. Finally, this arresult is a fractured reading of the CFA, leaving ticle urges the Illinois appellate courts to address
several state appellate courts at odds with the Il- their differences withLaughlinand suggests that
the Illinois Supreme Court clarify that deception
linois Supreme Court.
Prior to Laughlin, case law interpreting sec- is not a necessary element to asserting a CFA
tion 2 of the CFA4 developed three distinct types claim.
of violations: (1) nondeceptive unfair acts or
6
practices; 5 (2) deceptive acts or practices;
and (3) unfair methods of competition.7
The Laughlin decision significantly reL aurence M. Landsman is a partner in the firm
stricts the CFA's scope by limiting the
B lock & Landsman. The firm concentrateson civil
statute's protections only to conduct that
8
a id commerciallitigation,including complex matdefrauds or deceives consumers or others.
ters of consumerfraud, securitiesfraud, toxic tort,
However, Laughlin's abolition of
"nondeceptive unfair acts or practices" as
a id class action cases. Mr.Landsman receivedhis
B achelor ofArts from Syracuse University in 1986
violations of the CFA failed to produce an
a id graduatedwith honorsfrom IITIChicago-Kent
outpouring of either protest or support.
College ofLaw in 1989.
Rather, with a few notable exceptions, subsequent appellate opinions have spumed
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I.
PRE-LAUGHLIN
APPLICATIONS OF THE CONSUMER
FRAUD ACT
The Consumer FraudAct 0 declares unlawful:
[U]nfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices, including but
not limited to the use or employment of any
deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact,
with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such
material fact ....
The legislature's decision to leave the phrases
"unfair acts or practices" and "unfair methods
of competition" undefined has been readily acknowledged as appropriate." These terms are
"inherently insusceptible of precise definition,"
and accepted wisdom has found futility in attempting "to anticipate and enumerate all the
[unfair] methods and practices that fertile minds
2
might devise."'
Although the CFA leaves these terms undefined, Illinois courts section 2 of the CFA' 3 provides guidelines for applying the statute to particular fact scenarios. Specifically, section 2 states
that courts shall construe its terms with consideration given to interpretations of section 5(a) of
4
the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA").'
Moreover, federal courts interpreting the FTCA
have found the term "unfair" to have "a venerable history of interpretation and definition...
and now can be said to have a well-settled meaning in Federal trade-regulation law " 5 Thus, prior
to Laughlin, Illinois case law readily accepted
federal interpretations of the FTCA as the guide6
post in applying the CFA to state claims.'
1997

A.
Pre-Laughlin Illinois
Law Adopted Federal Interpretations of
Unfair Acts or Practices
Federal law authorizes the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to proscribe practices as unfair
or deceptive regardless of their effect on competition, subject to deferential judicial review. 7 In
FTC v. Sperry andHutchinson Co., 8 the United
States Supreme Court adopted the FTC's criteria to determine whether conduct, unfettered by
allegations that it is either anticompetitive or
deceptive, is nonetheless unfair. 9 The following
factors have become known as the "S & H Cri20
teria":
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or
otherwise - whether, in other words, it is
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; and
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other business).2 1
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the S &
H Criteria in Scott v. Associationfor Childbirth
atHome, International.22 In Scott, the court recognized that the term "unfair" is "inherently insusceptible of precise definition ...[and that]
effective regulation requires that the concept be
flexible, defined on a case-by-case basis " ' The
court cited Sperry to conclude that the terms "unfair acts or practices" and "unfair methods of
competition" were sufficiently definite and well
FeatureArticle * 55

agreement with Blue Cross limited each defenestablished. 24
In noting CFA violations, several Illinois de- dant to a 5% profit.3 The Illinois Department of
cisions cite Scott as well as Sperry.25 Thus, the Insurance approved the contracts, making them
pre-Laughlin standard appeared to use the S & a matter of public record.33
The plaintiffs alleged that Blue Cross was the
H Criteria as a fixture for CFA analysis. 26 However, without any meaningful explanation, only third-party payor with such an arrangement
Laughlin abandoned these principles and splin- with the defendants. As such, the plaintiffs
claimed that the contracts violated the CFA and
tered the cohesive interpretations of the CFA.
the Antitrust Act 34 because the defendants ultimately charged Blue Cross less than the plainII.
LAUGHLIN V EVANSTON
tiffs for the same hospital services.
HOSPITAL AND ITS PROGENY
The trial court dismissed both counts of the
A.
Laughlin v. Evanston plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state causes of
Hospital
action.36 The appellate court reversed the disIn Laughlin v. Evanston Hospital,27 the trust- missal of the Antitrust Act claim, finding that
ees for two union health plans filed a class ac- price discrimination can violate theAntitrustAct
37
tion complaint against several Chicago-area hos- if it unreasonably restrains trade. However, the
pitals on behalf of similarly situated third-party court affirmed the dismissal of the CFA claim.
health insurance providers who indemnified or Specifically, it concluded that material deception
insured patients for the cost of hospital services. 8 does not exist where a buyer alleges that he was
Their two-count complaint alleged that the de- unaware that his seller, in a contract of public
a competitor a lower price for
fendants violated the Consumer Fraud Act and record, granted
38 Moreover, the court was unpersuaded
29
services.
the Illinois Antitrust Act (the "Antitrust Act")
by engaging in anticompetitive pricing practices. that the defendants' conduct was unfair. It found
In particular, each defendant hospital charged no authority that prohibited a seller from chargall third-party payors, including the plaintiffs, the ing different customers different prices or from
buyers on a
same fee for all services. However, each defen- granting bigger discounts to volume
3
9
dant had a similar contract with Health Care Ser- basis other than cost savings.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the apvices Corporation, the administrator of the Illinois Blue Cross Plan ("Blue Cross"), that pro- pellate court's ruling on the Antitrust Act claim,
vided for an annual reconciliation of accounts finding that the Antitrust Act resembles the fedAct4 more closely than
between the defendants and Blue Cross. 31 Pur- eral antitrust Sherman
4
suant to these contracts, Blue Cross made peri- the Clayton Act. ' In a ruling with significant
odic payments to each defendant based upon the repercussions for CFA claims, the supreme court
hospitals' posted charges. However, if the total interpreted the Antitrust Act in conformity with
of Blue Cross' interim payments during the its federal counterpar-and contrary to the Clayton
course of the year exceeded 105% of the Act-to hold that the state statute did42not prohibit
hospital's actual costs for the sevices provided, nonpredatory price discrimination.
Next, the supreme court addressed the plainthe amount in excess was returned.3 Thus, the
56 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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tiffs' allegation that the defendants' price discrimination violated the CFA as an unfair method
of competition.43 Denying the claim's validity,
the supreme court refused to hold the defendants
liable under the CFA for alleged federal-type
antitrust conduct, e.g., nonpredatory price discrimination as prohibited by the ClaytonAct that
did not violate the Antitrust Act.44 To hold otherwise, would allow improper use of the CFA as
an "additional enforcement mechanism of the
antitrust legislation" ' 45 The state supreme court
then broadly held, without limitation to unfair
methods of competition that "[t]he language of
the Act shows that its reach was to be limited to
conduct that defrauds or deceives consumers or
others. '46 Thus, as specifically condemned by the
concurring opinion,47 the supreme court eliminated nondeceptive unfair acts and practices as
violations of the CFA.

guish Laughlin or even acknowledge its existence.
In the ensuing years, no less than six additional
published opinions rendered by the First and
Second Districts applied the S & H Criteria to
find that unfair acts or practices violated the
CFA.53 Most recently, Saunders v. MichiganAvenue NationalBank 4 specifically noted that a
plaintiff may allege nondeceptive unfair conduct
as a separate violation of the CFA.55 Yet, neither
Saunders nor the other cases even mentioned
Laughlin.56
At the other end of the spectrum, the Fifth
District adopted the Illinois Supreme Court's
deception requirement without question or analysis in Sullivan's Wholesale Drug Co. v. Faryl's
Pharmacy,Inc. 57 The plaintiff in Sullivan's alleged that the defendant nursing home violated
the CFA by failing to inform the home's residents that it kept 15% of the amount charged for
prescriptions filled by another pharmacy.5 8 The
B.
Post-LaughlinCases
court embraced Laughlin by opining that the IlRemarkably, several appellate court decisions linois Supreme Court "has now held quite exrendered after Laughlinrefused to acknowledge plicitly that, unlike the Federal law, the reach of
its holding as precedent. In Elder v. CoronetIn- the Consumer Fraud Act is limited to conduct
suranceCo.," a decision rendered seven months that defrauds or deceives consumers or others. 59
afterLaughlin, the First District applied the S &
Federal cases interpreting Illinois law are simiH Criteria to find that the defendant insurance larly adrift.6" Most poignant is Kedziora v.
company's sole reliance on polygraph tests in CiticorpNational Services, Inc.,1 in which the
denying insurance claims was a nondeceptive court concluded:
unfair trade practice under the CFA. 49 Notably,
the court failed to discuss or even cite Laughlin.
"It is hard to know which is more puzzling:
Subsequently, in People ex rel. Hartigan v.
Laughlin'sreading of the statute orKnecht's
Knecht Services, Inc.,50 the Second District apand Elder's disregard of Laughlin. Those
plied the S & H Criteria to hold that the defentwo Appellate Districts do not distinguish
dant violated the CFA by engaging in unfair pracLaughlin. Instead, they plainly ignore it,
tices." The Knecht opinion acknowledged that
looking instead to the Sperry & Hutchinson
the determination of an unfair practice under the
analysis under the federal statute.'62
CFA is distinct from a finding of a deceptive practice.12 Again, the court did not attempt to distinCompelled to follow the Laughlin court's in1997
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terpretation of state law, in Kedziora, the court
held that CFA claims required a showing of deception. 63
The rift created by the post-Laughlin cases
implies one of two conclusions. Either the First
and Second Districts act independently, without
regard to the doctrine of stare decisis, or there is
a need to clarify for litigants and trial courts that
nondeceptive unfair acts or practices are still
considered violations of the CFA.
The appellate courts should continue to stand
as a strong line of defense on behalf of consumer
rights. However, for this to preserve, they should
address their differences with Laughlin head-on.
Otherwise, the risk exists that trial courts will
continue to be faced with the unenviable choice
of rejecting precedent within their own districts
or repudiating the Illinois Supreme Court opinion. The ultimate responsibility to clarify the
scope of the CFA's protections rests with the Illinois Supreme Court.

A.
Laughlin's Stated Purpose Is
Unrelated To Nondeceptive Unfair
Conduct

The court's attempt to prevent the CFA from
becoming an "additional antitrust enforcement
mechanism" only has relevance to the CFA provision prohibiting unfair methods of competition.
In particular, the plaintiffs in Laughlin sought to
have the defendants held liable under the CFA
for conduct which the court previously found to
be not actionable under theAntitrustAct. 65 Thus,
the court faced the self-described dilemma of effectively expanding the scope of Illinois' antitrust laws to include Clayton Act violations by
declaring that the CFA covered the challenged
conduct.
The CFA is to be construed in accordance with
the FTCA.66 Therefore, the plaintiff's argument
possessed support. In addition, conduct prohibited by the FTCA's ban on unfair methods of
competition has been interpreted to include
nonpredatory price discrimination as defined in
III.
THE STATE SUPREME
the Clayton Act.67 Thus, in the court's view, the
COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT
logical application of the CFA's prohibition
NONDECEPTIVE UNFAIR CONDUCT
REMAINS A VIOLATION OF THE CFA
against unfair methods of competition would include banning Clayton Act violations.
The court inLaughlinappears concerned about
The court in Laughlin, however, in an effort
attempts which circumvent the Antitrust Act's
to prevent the CFA from becoming an "additional
perceived limitations by exploiting the CFA. The
antitrust enforcement mechanism" sought to difcourt, however, reacted by emasculating the
ferentiate CFA claims based on unfair methods
CFA's reach and purpose, e.g., proverbially
of competition from the statute's federal counthrowing the baby out with the bath water.64 It is
terpart. That goal would have been achieved
time for the court to restore validity to its aumerely by declaring that deception is an element
thority in the consumer fraud arena by reaffirmof CFA actions premised on unfair methods of
ing that consumers retain the CFA's protections
competition involving Clayton Act violations.
against nondeceptive unfair acts or practices and
The court, however, went beyond its stated purthat only unfair methods of competition based
pose by holding that all CFA claims require an
on Clayton Act violations require deception unelement of deception. Clearly, preventing legitider the CFA.
58 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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mate actions for nondeceptive unfair conduct did
not remedy the court's use of the CFA to unduly
expand the state's antitrust legislation.
B.
Laughlin is Contrary to the
CFA's Purpose
The court's stated rationale for limiting the
CFA seems strained. Initially, the court cited the
CFA's title to support its holding. The title states
that the CFA's enactment occurred in order to
"protect consumers and borrowers and businessmen against fraud, unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices."6
Inexplicably, there is no discussion as to how this
title, which includes the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," supports the absolute
requirement for deception. In addition, the court
determined that various sections of the CFA
which prohibit specific conduct all include
fraud.69 However, unlike the provision regarding unfair methods of competition and unfair acts
or practices, none of these sections is grounded
in the FTCA.
C.
Laughlin's Holding is
Contrary to Historical CFA Construction
The court's failure to limit the deception requirement to CFA claims premised upon unfair
methods of competition undermines the liberal
construction afforded to the CFA. Moreover,
both Congress and the Illinois legislature specifically left the concept of "unfair" open for interpretation, thus, to be determined on a caseby-case basis. Pre-Laughlin cases found the
application of the S & H Criteria appropriate.
Yet, Laughlin effectively nullified the value of
the opinions of the legislature and the courts. By
not addressing these prior interpretations, the
1997

court failed to develop a justifiable rationale for
requiring a plaintiff asserting a CFA claim based
on an unfair act or practice to also prove deception.
D.
Laughlin Needlessly
Contradicts Prior Illinois Supreme Court
Decisions
Laughlin'shostility toward its own prior decisions is unwarranted. The decision did not discuss Scott an opinion necessarily invalidated by
Laughlin which specifically adopted the S & H
Criteria to evaluate whether a nondeceptive unfair act or practice in violation of the CFA exists. 7'

Moreover, Laughlin summarily disposed of
Fitzgerald72 on the largely irrelevant basis that
it involved a complaint by third-party consumers alleging that the defendant had engaged in
deceptive conduct. 73 This distinction misapprehends the prior decision. Like Laughlin, the
Fitzgeraldcourt did not allow provisions of the
Clayton Act to become state antitrust violations
"through the 'Back Door' of the Consumer Fraud
Act."74 Further, the court decided that, although
every violation of the Clayton Act was not an
unfair or deceptive practice, the state legislature
had not expressly or by implication rejected similar legislation. 7 Thus, because anticipating all
methods of unfair competition would be futile,
the Fitzgeraldholding stated that Clayton Act
violations can also violate the CFA.76
It is apparent that, the Laughlin court should
have limited its holding to requiring deception
only for claims of unfair methods of competition involving Clayton Act violations. Thus, in
doing so no conflict among the various decisions
addressing these issues would exist.
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E.

IV.

The Future of Laughlin

CONCLUSION

Appellate courts have correctly separated
To the extent the court felt obligated to prevent the CFA from becoming an additional anti- nondeceptive unfair acts or practices as a distrust enforcement mechanism, Laughlin should creet violation of the CFA. However, they perhave expanded on Fitzgerald,not avoided it.The petuate the "puzzlement" over CFA application
court should have ruled that only unfair meth- by failing to address Laughlin. These courts
ods of competition premised upon Clayton Act should explain their decisions so as to provide
violations require an element of deception. The guidance to trial courts, comfort for aggrieved
court should have then affirmatively stated that consumers, and send a message to those who
any other type of unfair method of competition, would treat consumers unfairly. Moreover, the
and all unfair acts or practices, remain CFA vio- Illinois Supreme Court should explain that the
lations regardless of any attendant deception. By CFA continues to prohibit nondeceptive unfair
so holding, the court would have shown that it acts or practices and that only unfair methods of
stood squarely behind consumers in their con- competition involving Clayton Act violations
tinual struggle against the new and reoccurring require some degree of deception. If these points
are clarified, consumers will continue to seek
methods of unfair acts or practices.
relief for nondeceptive unfair acts or practices,
as was intended.
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550 N.E.2d 986 (I11.1990).
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5 See Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, Int'l., 430
N.E.2d 1012 (198 1); People ex rel. Fahner v.Testa, 445 N.E.2d
1249 (1st Dist. 1983); People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich, 438
N.E.2d 924 (2nd Dist. 1982); Perrin v. Pioneer Nat'l Title
Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 508 (1st Dist. 1980).
6 See Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n No. 1 v. First
Condominium Dev. Co., 557 N.E.2d 246 (1st Dist. 1990).
7 See Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 380 N.E.2d 790
(1978).
6 Laughlin, 550 N.E.2d at 993.
9 See Griffen v. Universal Casualty Co., 654 N.E.2d 694, 703
(1st Dist. 1995); Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins.Agency, Inc.,
635 N.E.2d 452, 459-60 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 642 N.E.2d
1278 (1994); Jones v. Universal Casualty Co., 630 N.E.2d 94
(1st Dist. 1994); Totz v. Continental DuPage Acura, 602
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N.E.2d 1374 (2nd Dist. 1992); Ekl v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d
156, 163 (2nd Dist. 1991); Elder v. Coronet Ins. Co., 558
N.E.2d 1312 (1st Dist. 1990).
'0 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2(a) (West 1984).
Scott, 430 N.E.2d at 1018-19. See also Hedrich, 438 N.E.2d
at 927; Testa, 445 N.E.2d at 1252.
12 Scott, 430 N.E.2d at 1018 (quoting Fitzgerald,380 N.E.2d at
794 (citation omitted)).
13 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (West 1984).
14

'5

16
17

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) states: "[u]nfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."
Scott, 430 N.E.2d at 1018.
See supra note 5.
Perrin,404 N.E.2d at 513; American Fin. Servs. v. FTC, 767
F.2d 957,968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The FTCA similarly leaves
the term "unfair" to be defined by the FTC and the courts.
The House Conference Report on Section 5 of the FTCA succinctly stated:
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It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all
unfair practices. there is no limit to human inventiveness
in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to adopt the
method of definition, it would undertake an endless task.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1994). See also S. REP. No. 597, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1994).
11FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
19 Id. at 245 n.5 (quoting Statement of Bases and Purpose of
Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfairor Deceptive Advertising
andLabeling of Cigarettesin Relation to the HealthHazards
of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964)).
20 American Fin. Servs., 767 F.2d at 971.
1980, the FFC issued a policy statement that set forth a new
standard for identifying practices which are unfair to consumers:
To justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy
three tests. It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition that the practice produces; and it must be an
injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably
have avoided.

defendant's pyramid scheme was "inherently deceptive").
Interestingly, many post-Laughlindecisions have maintained
a more clear distinction. See infra note 46 and surrounding
text.
z 550 N.E.2d 986 (111. 1990).
28

29 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/ 1-11 (West 1982).
1 Laughlin, 550 N.E.2d at 987.
31 Id.
32

2

34

37

Id. at 471.

38

Id. at 470.

39

Id.

-

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).

4, Laughlin, 550 N.E.2d at 990.

court cited several federal decisions establishing that the
Sherman Act does not proscribe price discrimination in and
of itself. Id. at 989. Rather, the Sherman Act prohibits predatory price discrimination, which occurs when the seller offers a product or service below cost. Id. (citations omitted).

42 The

Id. at 1018 (quoting Fitzgerald,380 N.E.2d at 794).
1018.
People ex rel. Fahner v. Walsh, 461 N.E.2d 78, 81 (2nd Dist.
1984) (finding pyramid program in violation of the CFA);
Hedrich, 438 N.E.2d at 928-29 (using S & H Criteria to find
the owner of mobile home village in violation of the CFA);
see generally Testa, 445 N.E.2d at 1252 (applying S & H
Criteria in determination that owner/operator of mobile home
lot violated Act by not permitting tenants to sell their homes
unless the homes were removed from the lot after sale, thereby
enabling defendant to buy certain homes at prices as much as
50% below those offered by other potential purchasers). But
see Kellerman v. Mar-Rue Realty & Builders, Inc., 476 N.E.2d
1259, 1263 (1st Dist. 1985) (finding that the CFA requires
the existence of a misrepresentation or a deceptive omission
of material fact with an intent that others rely upon such a
misrepresentation or omission).
Many pre-Laughlin cases obfuscated the theories on which
liability was founded, often citing the S & H Criteria to determine that the defendants had engaged in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." See, e.g., Hedrich,438 N.E.2d at 92829 (citing Sperry in determining whether a practice was "deceptive or unfair"); Walsh, 461 N.E.2d at 81-82 (applying S
& H criteria to find that conduct violated the CFA because
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The Antitrust Act provides in section 3 that:
Every person shall be deemed to have committed a violation
of this Act who shall: (2) ... by contract, combination, or
conspiracy with one or more other persons unreasonably restrain trade or commerce ....

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3(2) (West 1982).
35 Laughlin, 550 N.E.2d at 987.
3 Laughlin v. Evanston Hosp., 516 N.E.2d 468, 469 (1st Dist.
1987).

24 Id. at
5

Id.

3 Id.

21 In

American Fin.Servs., 767 F.2d at 971. See Letter from Federal Trade Commission to Senators Ford and Danforth (Dec.
17, 1980), reprintedin H. R. REP. No. 156, Pt. 1,98th. Cong.,
1st Sess. 33-40 (1983), at 36. However, Illinois courts have
adhered to the use of the S & H Criteria for interpreting the
CFA ban against unfair acts or practices. See supra note 5,
infra note 46.
22 Scott, 430 N.E.2d 1012.

Id.

43

4

Id. at 992.
Id. The court further found the committee comments to the
Antitrust Act to be in accord:
[I]t was not considered wise to incorporate all features of
the comparable federal legislation. S.B. 116 is similar to
the federal Sherman Act of 1890... It was not deemed
necessary or desirable to include measures comparable to
the several substantive antitrust sections of the Clayton
Act of 1914.
Id. at 991 (quoting Commentary on the 1967 Illinois
Antitrust Act, Committee on Antitrust. Law of the Chicago
BarAssociation at 441 (1967)).

45 Id. at 993.
6

Id.

47 Id. at 995 (Clark, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice

Clark disagreed with the majority's rationale that the CFA's
prohibitions are limited to conduct that is either fraudulent or
deceptive. He concluded that conduct can be "unfair" under
the CFA even if it violates the Clayton Act. He concurred on
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the ground that the conduct did not violate the Clayton Act
because the Clayton Act limited discriminatory pricing prohibitions in sections 2(a) and 2(c) to conduct affecting "commodities." Id.
558 N.E.2d 1312 (1st Dist. 1990).
9 Id. at 1316. Interestingly, the court noted that the Second
District blurred the distinction somewhat between unfair practices and deceptive practices by adopting the criteria to hold
that the defendant's failure to disclose was an "unfair or deceptive practice." Id. (citing Hedrick, 438 N.E.2d at 92829.) After finding that the defendant engaged in an unlawful
unfair practice, the Elder court proceeded separately to determine that the defendant also violated the CFA by engaging
in a deceptive practice. Id. at 1321-22.
People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht Servs., Inc., 575 N.E.2d
1378 (2nd Dist. 1991).
5' Id. at 1387.
-2 Id. at 1385-87. The court engaged in a separate analysis applying different criteria to determine whether the defendant's
conduct constituted a deceptive practice under the CFA. Id.
at 1387.
-3 See supra note 9.
54 Saunders v. Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 602 (1st
Dist. 1996).
"5 Id. at 608.
56Additionally, at least one federal court interpreting Illinois law
failed to address the existence of Laughlin. In Elliott v. ITT
Corp., 150 F.R.D. 569, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1992), the court quoted
Elder and Knecht in recognizing that unfair conduct constitutes a violation of the CFA.
'7

Sullivan's Wholesale Drug Co. v. Faryl's Pharmacy, Inc., 573
N.E.2d 1370 (5th Dist.), cert. denied, 580 N.E.2d 136 (1991).

-1 Id. at 1373.
-9 Id. at 1376 (quoting Laughlin, 550 N.E.2d at 993).
6 See, e.g., Gadson v. Newman, 807 F. Supp. 1412, 1420 (C.D.
Ill. 1992) (holding that under Laughlin, a cause of action under the CFA must involve conduct that either "defrauds" or
"deceives" others); Cf. Elliot, 150 F.R.D. at 578 (citing with
approval the use of the S & H Criteria in Knecht).
61Kedziora v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 780 F Supp. 516 (N.D.
Ill. 1991).
62 Id.
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63 Id. at

533-34 (citing Sullivan, 573 N.E.2d at 1376 n.1).
, The court noted that holding otherwise would conflict with
theAntitrustAct's legislative intention regarding prohibitions
against Robinson-Patman type activities. "[T]he legislature
in theAntitrustAct declined to include provisions against price
discrimination because the legislature found that inclusion of
such prohibitions would be undesirable. To construe the CFA
to give a cause of action for discriminatory pricing that the
legislature refused to give under the Antitrust Act would be
incongruous." Laughlin, 550 N.E.2d at 993.

6

Id. at 987-990.

815 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 505/2 (1984).
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 454 (1986); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953).
6 Laughlin, 550 N.E.2d at 993 (quotingHistorical and Statutory
Notes to 815 ILCS 505/1.
69Id.
70 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10(a) (West 1984).

67 See

71

Scott, 430 N.E.2d at 1018.

7 See Fitzgerald,380 N.E. 2d at 793-94.
13 The court also distinguished Perrin,supranote 5, on the same
grounds. In Laughlin, the plaintiffs were competitors of the
defendants, not third persons, and the contracts at issue were
matters of public record. However, neither Fitzgerald nor
Perrinrelied on the fact that the complaints were made by
third party consumers as opposed to competitors. Nor did
these cases rely on any meaningful deception. Rather, both
cases decided that a violation of the Clayton Act can be, but
is not always, a violation of the CFA. See Fitzgerald,380
N.E.2d at 793; Perrin,404 N.E.2d at 513. Furthermore, privity between the plaintiff and the defendant is not required.
Elder, 558 N.E.2d at 1312.
7 Fitzgerald,380 N.E.2d at 793 (citation omitted).
75
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Id. The plaintiffs, sellers and purchasers of real estate, had
obtained preliminary reports of title and mortgage insurance
policies from the defendant. The defendant submitted to the
plaintiffs' financial institutions invoices reflecting "customary seller's charges" and "customary buyer's charges," but
did not disclose that the defendant paid the financial institutions a ten percent rebate and/or discount with respect to these
charges. Id. at 791-92.
Id. at 793.
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